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Abstract: According to the multi-project and program management theory, this paper analyzes the 
program generation principle and establishes a program based on progress goals. On the basis of the 
present situation of calculation of penalty for delay of the bidding section construction period with 
the critical path method, we studied the effects of contractor-induced delay of the bidding section 
construction period in detail, including the effects on the construction period of the bidding section 
itself, the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections, and 
the construction period of the program, and then constructed a penalty model for delay of the 
bidding section construction period from the perspective of programs. Using the penalty model, we 
conducted a practical analysis of penalty for delay of the construction period of the Baoying station 
program in the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. The model can help determine the amount 
of penalty for delay of the construction period in bidding sections scientifically and reasonably.     
Key words: program establishment; program management; bidding section construction period; 
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1 Introduction 
Program management is one of the main contents of large and medium-sized project 
management. Progress goal control of large and medium-sized projects is one of the important 
ways to achieve strategic objectives. There is a close relationship between progress goals and 
strategic objectives, and strategic objectives determine progress goals. Strategic objectives are 
composed of general goals and sub-goals. In order to achieve the strategic objectives of 
different levels, large and medium-sized projects need to be decomposed into work breakdown 
structures corresponding to the strategic objectives of different levels; therefore large and 
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medium-sized projects are a typical multi-project system. Considering the close relations 
between progress goals and strategic objectives and such factors as multiple levels of progress 
goals, high requirements for the construction period and project completion rate, and strong 
conditionality between the progress goals of different levels of large and medium-sized 
projects, it is necessary to control the progress goals of different levels, especially those of 
higher levels. Progress goals of higher levels often depend on multi-projects; therefore, 
program management is necessary, and penalty for delay of the construction period is one of 
the measures to control the progress goals.  
The existing methods for calculation of penalty for construction delay are suitable for a 
single project but cannot solve multi-project problems effectively. A single project consists of 
several pieces of work that coordinate with each other. If a piece of work is delayed, the delay 
time can be made up by accelerated construction; even if it cannot be offset completely, it only 
influences the schedule of itself. However, for large and medium-sized projects, program 
schedule management with the basic unit placed on progress goals of bidding sections is more 
important, and the progress goals of the program are related to different contractors, who take 
charge of different bidding sections. Compared with a single project, it is difficult to remove 
the impact of delay in bidding sections by accelerated construction. When the delay in a 
bidding section influences not only the construction period of itself but also the earliest start 
times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections and the construction 
period of the program, the claims include the following parts: the employer’s claim for the 
delayed bidding section itself, the contractors’ claims for the impacts on the next bidding 
section and other subsequent bidding sections, and the employer’s claim for the influence on 
the program. If the delay in a bidding section does not exceed its free float, it does not 
influence the earliest start time of the next bidding section; if it does not exceed its total float, 
it does not influence the construction period of the program. Thus, the influences of delay in 
bidding sections on a program are complex, and it is necessary to study the penalty for delay 
of the bidding section construction period in different situations. 
Some scholars have performed research as follows: Wang and Yang (2005) developed 
methods to optimize multi-contract incentive and chose the optimal construction period by 
establishing a leader-follower hierarchical decision model to keep the balance between the 
employer and contractor. He et al. (2005) solved the problems of project payment schedule 
with reward and punishment structures, and constructed a reward and punishment model based 
on time and payment. Zheng (2008) investigated the project incentive mechanism from the 
perspective of quality, safety, and schedule. The existing research focuses on the construction 
period incentive mechanism of a single project. However, there are few research and 
achievements on penalty for delay of the bidding section construction period from the 
perspective of programs. 
While in practical analysis, the penalty model for delay of the bidding section 
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construction period mainly relies on the relevant provisions (FIDIC 1999) and engineering 
practical experiences. According to the current penalty calculation method, a fixed penalty rate 
is taken, and the penalty for delay of the bidding section construction period is equal to the 
penalty rate multiplied by the contract amount. The method is only suitable for the case of a 
single project’s contract but not suitable for program cases. The reasons are as follows: on the 
one hand, the penalty calculation method only considers the loss caused by the delay in a 
bidding section itself but does not consider the effects on the earliest start times of the next 
bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections; on the other hand, it does not consider 
the impact on the construction period of the program. In the program case, the degree of 
influence on the program caused by delay in a bidding section only depends on days of delay 
but has nothing to do with the contract amount of the bidding section. However, according to 
the current penalty calculation method, the penalty for delay of the bidding section 
construction period depends on both the contract amount and penalty rate, which can not 
reflect the influence of the delay in the bidding section on the program objectively, and 
obviously, the amount of penalty calculated with the current penalty calculation method     
is unreasonable.  
Progress goals of a program will directly influence the realization of strategic objectives, 
and it is necessary to establish a penalty model for delay of the bidding section construction 
period based on the analysis of the influences of progress goals of the bidding sections on 
those of the program. In this study, through analysis of the progress goal system of large and 
medium-sized projects and construction of programs, we adopted the program management 
theory and the critical path method to establish a penalty model for delay of the bidding 
section construction period, and applied the penalty model to the Baoying station program in 
the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. 
2 Program based on progress goals 
2.1 Definition of program 
A program is a group of projects with common objectives, including the functional and 
controlling objectives, which cannot be achieved by a single project or part of projects, and the 
loss or failure of any project may lead to the failure of the common objectives. According to 
this definition, the division standards of a program should be common objectives; therefore, 
the components of a program are associated with each other. There are two kinds of programs: 
one consists of a group of relevant projects that have common objectives; the other is a 
combination of a series of purposeful and changeable activities. With the progress goal system, 
it is possible to establish programs with respect to different levels of progress goals (Feng et al. 
2010, 2011; Reiss et al. 2006; Turner et al. 2000). The construction period of programs is so 
important that it will directly influence the realization of the corresponding strategic objectives. 
Thus, attention should be paid to the following two points: one is the influences of the 
  
Jing-chun FENG et al. Water Science and Engineering, Sep. 2012, Vol. 5, No. 3, 350-360 353
construction periods of single projects or bidding sections on those of the program; the other is 
the interactions between single projects or between bidding sections.  
2.2 Generation of program based on progress goals 
According to the work breakdown structure, generally, large and medium-sized projects 
can be classified into stage projects, individual projects, bidding sections, and pieces of work. 
Accordingly, the progress goal system of large and medium-sized projects usually includes 
four levels: level 1 is the progress goal of different stage projects; level 2 is the progress goal 
of individual projects, which is also called the controlling goal; level 3 is the progress goal of 
bidding section schedules, which is also called the guiding objective; and level 4 is the 
progress goal of pieces of work, which is also called the implemental progress goal. According 
to the definition and the construction principle of the programs, it is possible to generate 
programs of large and medium-sized projects based on the progress goal system: the program 
corresponding to the progress goal of level 1 is composed of different stage projects; the 
program corresponding to the progress goal of level 2 is composed of different individual 
projects included in each stage project; the program corresponding to the progress goal of 
level 3 is composed of different bidding sections included in each individual project; and the 
program corresponding to the progress goal of level 4 is composed of different pieces of work 
included in each bidding section.  
3 Penalty model for delay of bidding section construction period  
Programs corresponding to progress goals of levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 focus on different 
projects. The penalty model for delay in bidding sections corresponding to the progress goal of 
level 3 is discussed in this paper. 
3.1 Influence of delay of bidding section construction period on programs  
In order to calculate the amount of penalty for delay in a bidding section scientifically, it 
is necessary to analyze the influence of delay in the bidding section on the program, which 
probably includes the influence on its own construction period, the earliest start times of the 
next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections, and the construction period of the 
program. Based on that, the penalty model is constructed, and the influence can be quantified 
by means of the losses caused by the delay in different aspects of the program (Browning 2001; 
Bubshait 2003; Pillai et al. 2002; Tareghian and Taheri 2006; Woodbine 2004; Broome and 
Perry 2002). 
3.2 Construction of penalty model  
3.2.1 Steps of model construction  
According to the critical path analysis and the program principle, if a delay takes place in 
a bidding section on the critical path, it will prolong the construction period of the program 
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inevitably. For non-critical bidding sections, if the delay in a bidding section exceeds its total 
float, it will influence the construction period of the program. Therefore, through analyzing the 
actual delay time, free float, and total float of the critical and non-critical bidding sections, it is 
possible to construct a penalty model for delay of the bidding section construction period. The 
steps of model construction are as follows: 
(1) According to the duration of the bidding sections and the mutual logical relationships 
between them, a double code network diagram for the program of bidding sections is drawn. 
(2) The critical path and the construction period of bidding sections are calculated    
and determined. 
(3) The total float and free float of each bidding section are calculated. 
(4) Based on the actual completion date and the delay time of each bidding section, the 
influence of delay in each bidding section on the program is analyzed. 
(5) According to the relationships between the actual delay time, the free float, and the 
total float of the bidding section, the penalty model for delay of the bidding section 
construction period is constructed for the following cases: (a) the actual delay time is less than 
or equal to the free float, (b) the actual delay time is more than the free float but less than or 
equal to the total float, and (c) the actual delay time is more than the total float. 
(6) For a given bidding section program, various losses of the program caused by delay in 
bidding sections are analyzed and calculated. 
3.2.2 Analysis of delay in bidding sections from perspective of programs  
Supposing that the number of bidding sections of a program is n, and the actual delay 
time of the ith bidding section is iT , the influences of delay in bidding sections are analyzed. 
3.2.2.1 Analysis of delay in bidding sections on critical path 
If a bidding section on the critical path is delayed, it will influence the program in the 
following aspects: the earliest completion time of itself, the earliest start times of the next 
bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections, and the construction period of      
the program. 
3.2.2.2 Analysis of delay in bidding sections on non-critical path 
If a bidding section on the non-critical path is delayed, the influence on the program 
caused by the delay should be analyzed in three cases: 
(1) If F0 i iT F< ≤ , where
 
FiF  is the free float of the ith bidding section, the delay in the 
ith bidding section only influences the construction period of itself, but has no influence on the 
earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections and the 
construction period of the program. 
(2) If F Ti i iF T F< ≤ , where
 
TiF  is the total float of the ith bidding section, the delay in the 
ith bidding section influences not only the construction period of itself, but also the earliest 
start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections. It has no 
influence on the construction period of the program. 
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(3) If Ti iT F> , the delay of the ith bidding section influences not only the construction 
period of itself, but also the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other 
subsequent bidding sections and the construction period of the program.  
3.2.3 Penalty function for delay of bidding section construction period from perspective 
of programs 
Considering the influence of delay in bidding sections on the critical and non-critical 
paths on the program, the penalty function for delay in bidding sections of the program is 
constructed.  
3.2.3.1 Penalty function for delay in bidding sections on non-critical path 
If a bidding section on the non-critical path is delayed by the contractor, the penalty 
function for delay in the bidding section is as follows: 
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where ( )if T  is the penalty function; iC  is the amount of claim from the employer against 
the contractor of the ith bidding section for its delay in the bidding section; i kC +  is the 
amount of claim from the contractor of the kth subsequent bidding section against the 
employer for delaying the construction period of the ith bidding section, and 1,  2, , k n i= −" ; 
and tC  is the amount of claim from the employer against the contractor of the ith bidding 
section for delaying the program resulted from the delay in the ith bidding section. 
3.2.3.2 Penalty function for delay in bidding sections on critical path 
If a bidding section on the critical path is delayed by the contractor, it will inevitably 
influence the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bedding 
sections and the construction period of the program. The penalty function for delay of the 
construction period in the bidding section included in the program is derived as follows: 
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4 Practical analysis of penalty for delay in Baoying station 
program in South-to-North Water Diversion Project 
The South-to-North Water Diversion Project is a complex large-scale project composed 
of numerous construction projects. Establishing an effective penalty model can help control 
the progress goals effectively. According to the work breakdown structure and objective 
decomposition system of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, a program system of the 
South-to-North Water Diversion Project was constructed based on the progress goals. The 
Baoying station program belongs to the progress goal of level 3 of the South-to-North Water 
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Diversion Eastern Route Project, which is composed of 14 bidding sections, including the 
housing project of control station (E), the green plant project of control station (N), civil 
construction and equipment installation (A), the Yanghuai Road (J), building construction and 
decoration engineering (M), pump and its affiliated equipment (B), motor and its affiliated 
equipment (C), sets of high- and low-voltage electrical equipment of 10 kV or below (L), sets of 
electrical cables with voltage lower than 11 kV (H), sewage disposal equipment manufacturing 
(G), bridge crane manufacturing (F), GIS switch group (I), main transformer (D), and 
microcomputer monitoring and video surveillance system (K). In this study, we conducted 
practical analysis of the penalty model from the perspective of the Baoying station program.  
4.1 Amounts of penalty obtained by current penalty calculation method  
The planned construction period, actual construction period, and contract amount of each 
bidding section of the Baoying station program and the penalty for delay in each bidding 
section that was calculated with the current penalty calculation method are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1 Penalty for delay in bidding sections of Baoying station program calculated with             
current penalty calculation method  
Bidding 
section 
Planned 
period (d) 
Actual 
period (d)
Actual days less or 
more than contract 
period (d) 
Contract 
amount 
(104 RMB) 
Penalty calculated with current method 
Ratio of reward or 
penalty (%) 
Reward or penalty 
(104 RMB) 
Less More Reward Penalty Reward Penalty 
A 489 490 0 1 4 009.03 0.5 0.5 0 20.05 
J 87 87 0 0 498.27 0.5 0.5 0 0 
M 65 185 0 120 226.55 0.5 0.5 0 11.33 
E 80 200 0 120 234.46 0.5 0.5 0 11.72 
N 171 51 120 0 135.78 0.5 0.5 6.79 0 
B 489 609 0 120 2 009.73 0.2 0.2 0 100.49 
C 458 218 240 0 928.00 0.2 0.2 46.40 0 
L 65 95 0 30 169.80 0.2 0.2 0 8.49 
H 327 357 0 30 112.78 0.2 0.2 0 5.64 
G 89 269 0 180 143.00 0.2 0.2 0 7.15 
F 89 149 0 60 34.95 0.2 0.2 0 1.75 
I 89 209 0 120 129.00 0.2 0.2 0 6.45 
D 90 210 0 120 80.00 0.2 0.2 0 4.00 
K 130 130 0 0 235.00 0.2 0.2 0 0 
The calculation of the amounts of penalty for the Baoying station program with the 
current penalty calculation method obeys the following rules: the penalty for delay of the 
principal projects is 0.5% per day of the contract amount; the penalty for delay of projects 
related to equipment fabrication and installation is 0.2% per day of the contract amount. The 
amount of penalty for delay of a bidding section is the product of the days of delay, the 
contract amount, and the penalty ratio of the bidding section. The highest amount of penalty is 
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5% of the contract amount. 
The problems in the current penalty calculation method for the Baoying station program 
are as follows: it does not consider the effects of delay in bidding sections on the earliest start 
times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections and the construction 
period of the program, and the penalty rate is predetermined. It is too simple and subjective, 
and lacks quantitative models; moreover, the calculation of the penalty for delay in bidding 
sections based on the contract amount is not in accordance with the actual situation from the 
perspective of programs. 
4.2 Amounts of penalty obtained by present penalty model  
By drawing the network planning diagram of the Baoying station program and calculating 
the time parameters, the critical path was found, which is A-D-H-I-K-N. Meanwhile, the total 
float and free float of each bidding section can be calculated with the critical path method. The 
network planning diagram and related parameters are shown in Fig. 1. The data in the left 
column of the tables are the earliest start time and earliest finish time of each bidding section, the 
data in the middle column are the latest start time and latest finish time of each bidding section, 
and the data in the right column are the total float and free float of each bidding section. The data 
in parentheses are the planned construction period of each bidding section, and the data in circles 
are the serial number of nodes. The solid line indicates the real construction process, and the 
dotted line indicates the virtual construction process.  
 
Fig. 1 Network planning diagram of bidding sections of Baoying station program  
With the data of investigation, delayed bidding sections were determined under different 
constraints. The penalty for delay of bidding section construction periods is calculated with the 
present penalty model. According to the location of bidding sections and the loss of the 
program caused by delay of the construction period, the delays in bidding sections are 
classified into two kinds: the delay in critical bidding sections and the delay in non-critical 
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bidding sections. Of all the critical bidding sections, sections D, H, and I are delayed, and the 
delay in these projects influences not only the construction period of themselves, but also the 
earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections and the 
construction period of the program. Of all the non-critical bidding sections, six bidding 
sections are delayed, in which the delay times of sections E and L are less than their free floats, 
and based on the analysis above, they only influences the construction periods of themselves; 
the delay time of bidding section B is more than its free float but less than its total float, with 
an effect on the earliest start time of the next bidding section, but with no effect on the 
construction period of the program; and the delay times of bidding sections M, G, and F are 
more than their total floats, having influence not only on the construction periods of 
themselves but also on the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent 
bidding sections as well as the construction period of the program. 
The amounts of penalty for delay in bidding sections calculated with the penalty model 
presented in this paper are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 Penalty for delay in bidding sections of Baoying station program calculated                   
with present penalty model 
Type of 
bidding 
section  
Bidding 
section 
Day of 
delay 
(d) 
FT FF 
Contract 
amount 
(104 RMB  ˅
Penalty (104 RMB  ˅ Total 
penalty 
(104 
RMB  ˅
Loss 1 Loss 2  Loss 3 
On 
critical 
path 
D 120 0 0 80.00 2.92 2.33 2.21 7.46 
H 30 0 0 112.78 1.20 2.47 2.75 6.42 
I 120 0 0 129.00 2.92 2.62 2.95 8.49 
On non- 
critical 
path 
E 120 238 238 234.46 5.30 0 0 5.30 
L 30 108 108 169.80 2.60 0 0 2.60 
B 120 238 0 2 009.73 2.92 20.30 0 23.22 
M 120 108 108 226.55 2.80 3.90 5.90 12.60 
G 180 2 0 143.00 3.50 3.20 4.10 10.80 
F 60 2 0 34.95 1.20 1.86 2.60 5.66 
Note: Loss 1 is the loss of employer due to delay of bidding sections, Loss 2 is the loss of contractors of subsequent bidding sections, and  
Loss 3 is the loss of employer due to delay of program. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
Penalties for delay in the six bidding sections D, H, I, M, G, and F calculated with the 
present penalty model are all more than those calculated with the current penalty calculation 
method. The main reason is that the delay in bidding sections D, H, I, M, G, and F influences 
not only the construction periods of themselves but also the earliest start times of the next 
bidding section and other subsequent bidding projects and the construction period of      
the program. 
Penalties for delay in bidding sections E, L, and B calculated with the present penalty 
model are all less than those calculated with the current penalty calculation method, as the 
delay in bidding sections E and L just influences the construction periods of themselves, and 
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the delay of bidding section B influences both the construction period of itself and the earliest 
start time of the next bidding section, but they have no influence on the construction period of 
the program. 
Taking bidding sections B and M as examples, the contract amount of bidding section B 
is 8.87 times that of bidding section M. Although both of them are delayed by 120 d, the 
penalty for the former is only 1.84 times that for the latter. The main reason is that the delay in 
bidding section B only has influence on the construction period of itself and the earliest start 
time of the next bidding section, while the delay in bidding section M has influence not only 
on the construction period of itself and the earliest start time of the next bidding section but 
also on the construction period of the program. The same case occurs in bidding sections    
H and L. 
5 Conclusions 
(1) Compared with the current penalty calculation method, the present penalty model 
considers the influence of delay in a bidding section not only on the construction period of 
itself but also on the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent ones 
and the construction period of the program, and the amounts of penalty for delay in the critical 
and non-critical bidding sections are determined under different conditions. The present 
penalty model is more reasonable to reflect the losses caused by delay in bidding sections.  
(2) If the delay in a bidding section only has influence on the construction period of itself, 
it is reasonable to calculate the penalty based on the contract amount of the bidding section; 
however, if the delay in a bidding section has influence not only on the construction period of 
itself, but also on the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent ones 
and the construction period of the program, the penalty for delay in the bidding section should 
be calculated with the present penalty model. 
(3) In the penalty model given in this paper, the penalty rate can be obtained by the 
amount of penalty divided by the number of days delayed. 
(4) The empirical results show that the greater the influence of delay in bidding sections 
on the program, the more reasonable the result obtained by the penalty model given in     
this paper. 
The losses caused by delay in bidding sections are influenced by many factors, even 
involving multilateral game; thus, it is necessary to perform further study on the quantification 
of the losses from different aspects of projects by combining with their practical schedules to 
get more reasonable results. 
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